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Anna Wójcik: Why is the principle of mutual trust between Member States
fundamental for the European Union? How does a State earn trust?
Koen Lenaerts: The Member States are all committed to the values referred to in
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. These include respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in a society characterised by
pluralism, tolerance and justice. These values are further explained in many other
provisions of the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
All Member States are required to adhere to those common values in their domestic
legal orders, which is why they can trust each other. In order to trust someone,
you need to be more or less able to predict how that person will behave. This does
not mean that the other person must do exactly the same thing as you. Within a
relationship of trust there is room for freedom to make one’s own choices. This is
also true among Member States. Each one makes its own policy choices. But these
choices must reach a common minimum threshold, in terms of values and of rules,
that applies to all Member States. 
The argument that ‘the EU is interfering with national competences’ misses the
point. States can only trust each other within the EU if they are confident that they
are all equally committed to the values of pluralism, tolerance and democracy, that
democracy being built, moreover, on fundamental freedoms and the principle of
solidarity. Provided that they respect this common foundation, Member States can
make their own choices in matters falling under national competences. Mutual trust
therefore means that Member States may make different choices, but also that they
must be able to trust each other because they share common values.  
For instance, behaviour that constitutes a criminal offence in Belgium may not be
punishable under criminal law in the Netherlands, Poland, or Portugal. But the
criminal proceedings in all Member States of the EU must be conducted before
fully independent, impartial courts, according to fair trial rules, with the rights of the
defence being respected and appropriate rules on the administration of evidence
observed. There is thus a basket of rules that need to be respected in order for a
judge in one Member State to put trust in proceedings before a court in another
Member State, which are governed by rules reflecting different legislative choices
made in that Member State. It is very important to distinguish this basic level of
commonality of values and meta-constitutional principles from the choices that each
State makes within this common framework.
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AW: Imagine there is a hypothetical country where disciplinary proceedings are
launched against judges who refer questions for a preliminary reference to the Court
of Justice of the EU. Can such a country be trusted in the EU legal space?
KL: Due to various cases currently pending before the Court of Justice, I cannot
answer your question.
AW: Are you aware that there are more than one thousand one hundred disciplinary
proceedings pending against judges in Poland at the moment?
KL: I am of course aware that there are disciplinary proceedings against judges in
Poland, because a lot of that information has been made public and, crucially, there
are also cases pending before the CJEU where parties provide factual information
in that regard that is, moreover, sometimes contradictory. But again, I cannot say
anything more while those cases are pending.
AW: Why is judicial independence crucial for the EU legal space?
KL: I can answer that question in detail and fully, because there is relevant case law
on this matter. These are, by the way, old cases, not involving Poland. 
There was the very famous Wilson case (C-506/04) involving the Grand-Duchy of
Luxembourg. Mr. Wilson was a British barrister who wanted to register as a lawyer in
Luxembourg. Although he intended to work only in English and French, his request
was dismissed because he did not know Luxembourgish and German. The Bar
Council informed Mr. Wilson that he could appeal that decision before a Disciplinary
and Administrative Committee which consisted, at first instance exclusively, and
on appeal principally, of lawyers registered at the Luxembourg Bar. Instead, Mr.
Wilson appealed to the Luxembourgish Administrative Courts, which asked the
CJEU whether such a body, essentially consisting of stakeholders – members of
the professional group whose decision was being challenged – was an independent
court within the meaning of EU law. Unsurprisingly, the answer was ‘no’. The CJEU
provided here for the first time a detailed explanation of what judicial independence
involves. 
That judgment was given in 2006. The CJEU ruled that effective judicial protection
is a general principle of Community – now Union – law stemming from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and enshrined in the
European Convention on Human Rights. It requires national courts to be
independent and impartial. 
Independence is, in the first place, freedom from all forms of external pressure. Not
only from the pressure of the ruling party and the legislative and executive powers,
but also from financial groups, technology industry giants, trade unions and any
other pressure groups. Judges should be fully insulated from any sort of pressure.
There is also an internal dimension to independence, meaning that judges must be
and must remain at an equal distance from all the parties to the dispute. A judge
must not have even the slightest personal interest in one party winning the case or
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losing it. The only interest that a judge may have in the outcome of the case must be
his or her professional interest in the correct application of the law. And the correct
application of the law can only be verified within the framework of the judicial process
itself, that is by bringing an appeal or a final cassation appeal or a final appeal before
the constitutional court, as it is possible in certain Member States. To coin a well-
known phrase: by exhausting the remedies within the judicial system. That equal
distance is also a matter of perception: none of the parties should entertain any
reasonable doubt as to the judge’s impartiality.
AW: There is a tendency in Poland and possibly also in some other Member States
to see the CJEU as pronouncing on judicial independence issues in relation to
current political disputes.
KL: As I explained, judicial independence is an important legal issue. There is case
law of both the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the Court of
Justice of the European Union on that issue, which is over 50 years old and was
developed in cases relating to the six original Member States.
AW: In public debates, there are many misconceptions about what a judge should do
in the case of a conflict between national law and EU law. Could you briefly explain
this?
KL: When national law is in conflict with EU law, there is no possible misconception
as to the principle that EU law prevails. Why? A populist way of presenting this
is often that Europe is somehow ‘crushing’ the Member States. Nothing could be
further from the truth. The Member States are the European Union. 
What is the unity, the uniformity of Union law? It is very simple. It is the ultimate
guarantee of equality. That principle is breached when, for example, taxpayers
in one Member State do not effectively benefit from the rights that they derive
from Union law concerning, say, free movement of capital or the freedom of
establishment. Or when, for instance, consumers are not protected against
unfair contractual terms. Or, and I refer here to the Wilson case that I mentioned
previously, when a British barrister does not enjoy an effective judicial remedy before
an independent court in Luxembourg, whereas his colleague, who would like to
register at the Paris Bar or the Frankfurt Bar, does benefit from such protection. In
all those examples, the problem is ultimately a breach of equality between citizens of
the Union. And EU law cannot accept this.
National courts are at the forefront in terms of applying EU law. The CJEU is, in a
sense,  a helpdesk for interpreting that law. A national court that refers a question
is responsible for applying EU law on the basis of the interpretation that the CJEU
provides because national courts are subject to the principle of supremacy of EU
law. Accordingly, they must apply that law and must decide, where necessary, that a
provision of national law is to be set aside in a particular case. 
Indeed, all Member States have agreed to transfer competences to the European
Union and provided that the EU has correctly exercised those competences in
adopting appropriate legislation, the law of the EU is the ‘law of the land’ in all EU
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Member States. The latter must therefore respect it. Member States are bound by
their commitment to confer certain competences to the EU. Provided that the EU
exercises those competences in compliance with the EU Treaties and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, the EU act at issue prevails over national law. 
Judges in all Member States refer questions to the CJEU on the correct
interpretation of Union law, precisely in order to be able to set aside any conflicting
provisions of national law. That is the essence of the direct effect and the supremacy
of EU law – principles established in 1963 in van Gend and Loos, a Dutch case, and
in 1964 in Costa v ENEL, an Italian case. Those principles apply equally to all EU
Member States.
AW: Again, in the public debate, there has been some disagreement concerning the
limits of the activity of judges. Can judges participate in demonstrations or express
their concerns in matters of public interest?
KL: Judges should not express themselves, through whatever medium, in a manner
which adversely affects the public perception of their impartiality. This does,
however, not prevent them from explaining the basic requirements of the rule of law.
There is in this respect an important judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights from 2016 in Baka v Hungary. In this judgment, one can read that judges
enjoy freedom of expression related to the basic values of the EU legal order,
such as democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights, etc. Having said that, the
traditions of Member States differ significantly within the EU, and the same is true
across the world, if one looks at it globally. 
I am Belgian, so if I take the Belgian example, judges in Belgium cannot participate
in political activities. That being said, according to the Baka judgment of the ECtHR,
they cannot be prevented from speaking out on the values I mentioned before. For
instance, it is acceptable for a Belgian judge to give a public lecture explaining what,
in his or her view, the requirements of the rule of law entail for the independence
and impartiality of courts, a fair trial, rights of the defence, the adversarial nature
of proceedings, fairness and presentation of evidence. He or she may also speak
publicly on judicial policy regarding such matters.
But suppose that a judge were to argue publicly that nuclear power plants should be
reopened in Belgium. That would be more problematic. It is important for a judge to
exercise self-restraint in his or her judicial office. 
AW: What should be done to avoid conflicts and splits among the professional legal
community?
KL: I understand your question as referring to the way judges are appointed.
Major conflicts on this issue within the professional legal community in a Member
State are of course undesirable. Such conflicts absolutely have to be resolved. There
are Member States where that sort of conflict resolution in the legal field works well,
thanks to a few very simple rules. 
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For instance, there is nothing wrong with Parliament making judicial appointments,
as long as there is a requirement of a qualified majority, for example a 2/3 majority.
That is, in itself, usually a guarantee of coalition building. On the contrary, requiring
a bare majority for such appointments is a source of potential conflict. Take for
example Germany. Candidates for the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal
Constitutional Court, are proposed by the political parties. However, a 2/3 majority in
Parliament is needed to elect them as judges. Thus, the system is geared towards
building consensus. Once judges are appointed, they have a single non-renewable
term of office of 12 years and can act fully independently. The requirement of a
2/3 majority means that every judge’s appointment is almost consensual. A judge
proposed by one party also has to be accepted by other parties in the Parliament to
achieve the 2/3 majority. Consensus building thus starts as soon as the proposal is
made. 
That reflects a political culture of what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas
calls ‘deliberative’ democracy. The parties may be in opposition to one another in
the democratic debate, but they are not enemies; they work together towards the
common good.
In the Kingdom of Belgium, the law requires that half the members of the
constitutional court must be former politicians. However, in order to be appointed, a
candidate needs to obtain a 2/3 parliamentary majority. Furthermore, a requirement
for consent from both the Francophone and Flemish communities must also
be met. Thus, all judges are elected with a 2/3 majority by Parliament and they
also need to have a simple majority in both linguistic groups. This means that all
francophone judges must be accepted by a simple majority in the Flemish group in
the Parliament, and vice versa. It works perfectly well. 
AW: Politicians do not like consensus building, they like polarisation. In Poland, they
spark polarisation by attacking judges and advocates general of the Court of Justice
of the European Union. What is your role as the President of the CJEU in countering
such attacks?
KL: My role is to explain, very openly, what we do. And to remind the politicians that
the European Union is their Union. 
There are representatives of every Member State in all EU institutions and they are
doing good work. 
The Court of Justice of the EU, with its judges and advocates general, acts as
a bridge between the EU institutions and bodies, on the one hand, and national
authorities, on the other hand. It is entrusted with the task of ensuring that the
domestic legal orders of the Member States and the common legal order of the EU
operate harmoniously and in concert. 
The EU is a common governance structure and an autonomous source of law.
That legal space produces rules that are common to all Member States. ‘Common’
means: the same across the entire Union. A fortiori the principles and values upon
which those rules are based are also common. The CJEU is the common judicial
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body which explains those rules through interpretation in its judgments and ensures
that all Member States are placed on an equal footing. It is a question of equality of
all Member States and their legal systems before Union law. 
The CJEU interprets existing rules. However, if politicians consider that certain
EU rules are inadequate, they should act in an appropriate way at EU level.
Politicians have many tools at their disposal. They can initiate new legislative acts
or amendments to existing ones. A more extreme option is the possibility for the
Member States, as “masters of the Treaties”, to modify the latter. That said, they can
by no means alter the common, core values shared by all members of the club. 
Imagine you are in the alumni club of your university and certain members are
disregarding the core values of the club. In such a situation, you would not like to
be associated with those other members. The same is true within the EU. When a
State is a member of the EU, it needs to be seen as having the same core values
as the other Member States. It is not a matter of a power grab or of singling out any
particular Member States for criticism. It is simply a matter of making the system
work. 
AW: Isn’t the CJEU, in a way, our protector against the current threats?
KL: Yes, it is, but with an important caveat. The CJEU never takes a case on its own
initiative. This is self-evident for lawyers. Some people however speak of the CJEU
as though it were choosing to pick up on certain problems and then make judgments
on them. This is totally wrong. The CJEU can only decide on cases when they are
submitted to it by instances that are entitled to do so: the European Commission, a
Member State or a national court, for example. 
Even where the CJEU is seized by one of those instances, the Court’s competence
is not without limits. For instance, certain references for a preliminary ruling are
referred to the Court by a national court and yet are not admissible. That said, it is for
the CJEU alone to decide that, and not for any national body. The CJEU thus has a
monopoly on deciding whether a reference made by a national court is admissible or
not since this is a matter of interpretation of EU law. That system has been in force
since the 1950s, when the preliminary reference mechanism was created.
The CJEU plays its part loyally. Sometimes, it declares a preliminary reference
inadmissible. That does not mean that there is no problem with the national
legislation as such. It simply means that the conditions for delivering a preliminary
ruling are not met in that particular case. 
It is important for the CJEU to preserve its own legitimacy. The Treaties circumscribe
its jurisdiction and the CJEU must therefore ascertain in every single case whether
that case falls within the limits of that jurisdiction. The reasoning set out in the
judgment must be transparent. 
When a reference for a preliminary ruling is declared inadmissible, no one is to
blame and certainly not the referring court. Lawyers know perfectly well that there
are borderline cases, where one can make arguments in both directions. A lawyer
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who loses a case is not a poor lawyer. The same is true of a judge whose reference
for a preliminary ruling was found to be inadmissible. It is of utmost importance in all
Member States that judges have the exclusive right to engage in judicial dialogue
with the CJEU.
This interview will be published in Polish in OKO.press and republished in Gazeta
Wyborcza. The English version appears simultaneously on the Rule of Law in
Poland blog.
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